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How MucH and How not to Explain: 
GEstural rEfErEncinG and concEptual 
Misappropriations
BrucE curtis
introduCtion
Don’t bring a rival company’s product to a job interview. It shows the 
hiring manager that you haven’t researched the company, their history, or 
their competitors. (WorkopolisTM advertisement, Toronto Star, 7 April 
2015)
This essay reflects on issues of intellectual community, citation and reference practices, and the nature of research infrastructure. Like 
any active reviewer of grant applications, book and article manuscripts, 
or any reader of a reasonably wide range of scholarly literature, I have 
often been struck and irritated by writers making dubious appeals to 
‘what everyone knows’ and by citation practices that are truncated, ges-
tural, or, at times, thoroughly mistaken.
What one fellow reviewer recently called ‘theoretical hand-waving’ 
is common, both in grant applications and in published work. Writers 
will begin with a brief theoretical statement, citing some authors or con-
cepts they claim are important to their projects, but will not use the con-
cepts invoked. In grant applications, the tactic is used by established 
scholars trying to travel on their reputations, or too busy to do the (outra-
geous) amount of work needed to write a serious application. Beginners, 
too, may lay claim to intellectual capital through the citation of lengthy 
lists of works that are decorative, because never put to use. Although 
sociologists are far from immune to the practice, many narrative histor-
ians seek to ‘get the theory out of the way’ so they can get on with story-
telling, with the result that they often reproduce in an acritical fashion 
common sense or ‘practice’ categories rather than analytic ones (for the 
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distinction, Cooper and Brubaker, 2000). Other writers avoid sustained 
interrogation of the phenomena they study by working to normalize 
them: when I read ‘it is not surprising that x...’ I wonder if the writer 
has abdicated the responsibility of taking distance from the everyday. Or 
again, one finds attempts to bolster claims, often ones weakly supported 
by evidence, through the use of such affirmations as ‘it is obvious that,’ 
‘clearly,’ ‘certainly,’ and so forth.
And there are the formulaic ways of presenting problems and issues. 
Guetzkow et al’s study of how American grant reviewers assess origin-
ality and innovation cites a panellist who immediately disqualifies any 
applicant who seeks to ‘fill a gap in the literature’ (2004: 197). The stock 
phrase seems to flag a lack of curiosity. At the same time, panellists saw 
applicants who worked in their field or used their framework to be more 
upright and more innovative than others. The first finding points to the 
dangers to applicants of following a formula; the second points to the 
strategic value of ‘hand-waving.’ Worst, of course, is the simple mis-ap-
propriation, mis-application, or mis-attribution of concepts (about which 
more below). 
On the other side of this coin is the fact that any speech commun-
ity has to share a common language with generally-agreed upon con-
cepts, categories, and ways of making claims and observations: what 
Lorna Weir (2008: 378) calls ‘mundane formulae of truth.’ Members of 
a community might treat their taken-for-granted practices as objects of 
scrutiny, and sociologists, whose objects of investigation necessarily in-
clude their own subjectivity, must do so. But only to scrutinize practices 
is to be unable to make use of them for investigative purposes. Thus, 
some things go without saying and many things have to go without be-
ing said at length for any community to go about its business. What can 
be taken for granted in communities which are internally diverse and 
rapidly changing is quite different from what can be assumed in tight-
ly-knit and internally homogeneous communities. The amorphous and 
rapidly-changing (or cyclical) nature of sociological concept-formation 
and analysis means that the taken-for-granted is often fleeting. It also 
means that members of sub-disciplines may not share a common con-
ceptual repertoire. If you are reading this, I predict that you would find 
a three-page explication of ‘the panopticon’ to be tedious and unneces-
sary. If you went to graduate school after 1990, however, I predict that I 
could not assume that you would immediately recognize the difference 
between ‘relative’ and ‘absolute surplus-value,’ understand immediately 
‘the degradation of labour,’ or have heard of ‘the problem with no name.’ 
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two further provoCationS
This essay was also provoked, first, by my reviewing an earlier version 
of Nob Doran’s fascinating contribution, in the current issue, on his rela-
tion with Michel Foucault’s late work. I enjoyed the piece thoroughly, 
and I was intrigued when he mentioned in a note that my Politics of 
Population (2001) had been squarely in the theoretical frame of Phil-
ip Corrigan and Derek Sayer’s (1985) The Great Arch: English State 
Formation as Cultural Revolution, but my Ruling by Schooling Quebec 
(2012) barely even mentioned that work (Doran 2015: note18). Instead, 
it was a work of governmentality. I am not about to offer a mea culpa 
nor critical commentary on Doran’s piece, but the remark made me think 
about sociological memory, and it suggested that Great Arch is another 
of those works which has been forgotten by those with whom I often 
wish to speak .
About the same time, I noticed that Derek Sayer had made Great 
Arch available online, noting that it was long out of print and used cop-
ies are very expensive (see http://coastsofbohemia.com/2013/08/24/cor-
rigansayer-the-great-arch-online/). Sayer restated the book’s main argu-
ment in a post and suggested some minor modifications to it, although he 
did not respond to critiques of the book’s tendency to assimilate all forms 
of regulation to state regulation. Still, as he points out, Great Arch identi-
fies state formation as an ongoing and continually problematic process, 
stretching across the longue durée. The process is bound up practices 
that both totalize and individualize political subjects. Projects of state 
formation typically mobilize a moral ethos, both to anchor legitimacy 
and to shape the character of political subjection. Those struggling in, 
over and through the state system seek legitimacy for politically organ-
ized subjection in various forms of moral regulation. Rule and domina-
tion are performative relations that mobilize ritual and symbolic resour-
ces (largely displaced in the then-current Foucauldian literature by pre-
occupations with routine and rationalization). State formation projects 
attempt to overcome class and other forms of difference through the fab-
rication of an illusory community. Thus, in part, Great Arch appealed to 
the dynamic of individualization and totalization that Foucault portrayed 
as the essence of pastoral power. Pastoral power, in turn, is an immediate 
precursor of governmentality (Foucault 1983; 1994a, b, c; 2007). To my 
reading, Corrigan and Sayer also foreshadowed Jacques Rancière’s re-
lated juxtaposition of ‘the people’ and ‘population’ as central categories 
in liberal government (1999; 2005). 
The arguments of Great Arch were taken up widely across the social 
sciences (e.g, in Glasbeek 2006; de Coninck-Smith 2001), but they were 
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also subjected to rough handling in the 1990s academic conflicts over 
Michel Foucault’s bones, especially those that fore grounded the early 
Anglo-Australian appropriations of Foucault’s work (Burchell 1991; 
Dean 1994; Valverde 1994). Those conflicts coincided with the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet empire, the decline of interest in academic Marxism, 
the political triumphs of varieties of neo-liberalism, and the mirroring 
of the latter’s anti-statist discourse in some readings that presented Fou-
cault’s governmentality as itself an anti-statist discourse. While Great 
Arch’s ‘moral regulation,’ is of Durkheimian origin, and concerns the 
formation of self-governing political subjects, such readings dismissed 
it as a crude form of social control (but not Hunt 1998). And critics for-
got or cared not to notice that ‘the state’ in Great Arch was meant to be 
thought in keeping with Philip Abrams’ ‘Notes on the difficulty of study-
ing the state’ (1988): that is, not as an actor, or an agent, or an apparatus, 
or a unitary entity, but as a violent political abstraction. 
Many, if not most entering graduate students in English Canadian 
sociology who were exposed to governmentality over the last couple of 
decades have come at it through Anglo-Australian renditions, although 
William Walter’s Governmentality (2012) may change things. Inter-
estingly, governmentality has not been widely picked up in French or 
French-Canadian debate, but writers who have done so have seen the 
work as a contribution to state theory (e.g., Labourier and Lascoumes 
2005). While the approach elaborated in Great Arch has faded from most 
of the Canadian landscape, the analysis remains prominent in French 
because of Pierre Bourdieu’s embrace and extension of it in his Collège 
de France lectures on the state (2014).
Much of Great Arch’s theoretical stance and many of its analytic 
strategies remain elements in the infrastructure of my own work and 
thinking. The book came at Foucault’s work as I did, from classical so-
cial theory, from English cultural Marxism, and from gritty historical 
sociological investigations of politics and government. The research I 
did on attempts to rule Quebec by schooling its population was centred 
on a core proposition from Great Arch: that projects of state formation 
are necessarily projects for the formation of political subjects. Rule is 
a relation between rulers and ruled, and one must study it in relational 
terms. Schooling lends itself particularly well to the investigation of in-
dividualization and totalization and of attempts to anchor political rule 
in the selves of the ruled. In the Quebec case, projects for schooling 
population led to pioneering social inquiries, in which intellectuals and 
state servants grappled with practical techniques of investigation. These 
are some of the neglected roots of Canadian social science. And, given 
the hegemony of the Catholic church and the seigneurial system, the case 
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involved a direct confrontation between rule based on pious pastoral ig-
norance and rule based on a cultivated intelligence and responsible self-
government (i.e. between pastoral and liberal modes of government).
Nob Doran’s remark that Corrigan and Sayer’s approach was absent 
from my work thus startled me, because it is apt—I don’t cite Great Arch 
in Ruling, and the book has ‘governmentality’ and not ‘state formation’ 
in the title—and inapt, since I think its approach is in the book’s foun-
dations. Doran and Sayer’s activities make we wonder: What can one 
assume in doing historical sociological work in Canada—or elsewhere? 
What does one need to explain and what can one take for granted before 
proceeding to analysis? Moreover, how do people point to what they as-
sume is taken for granted? What are some of the difficult or unacceptable 
ways of pointing and taking for granted? Is there a conceptual repertoire 
that we (me and you, my readers) share? I engage with these and related 
questions in what follows. 
CoMMunity reSearCh infraStruCture
All practice communities share basic epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological assumptions. For tightly-knit communities of research-
ers, writers or speakers, lengthy conceptual explication is redundant, and 
in the course of their work participants can usually content themselves 
with gestures to a common stock of knowledge. Matters are more compli-
cated for loosely-knit communities, of which academic sociology is one. 
The discipline’s internal diversity allows it to come at the most various 
questions imaginable from many different points of view, a strength that 
deepens insight. The same diversity makes a strong and consistent scien-
tific consensus impossible. As Pierre Bourdieu pointed out, a peculiarity 
of the academic discipline is that individuals or groups can advance in 
it by denouncing even those positions which are relatively widely held, 
something quite unlikely in one of the natural sciences (2001: 60-3).
Susan Leigh Star observed that practice communities share infra-
structures which are ‘learned as part of membership. The taken-for-
grantedness of artifacts and organizational arrangements is a sine qua 
non of membership in a community of practice.’ On the other hand, 
‘strangers and outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target object to be 
learned about. New participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its 
objects as they become members’ (Star 2010: 612). Yet new sociologists 
are often socialized only into regions of the discipline, and many come 
into the discipline in graduate school with assumptions from an under-
graduate education in one of its offspring, such as Women’s Studies, 
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Communication Studies, or Criminology. Diversity poses challenges for 
sociologists seeking to speak a common conceptual language. 
Learning key concepts is part of disciplinary socialization, but foun-
dational concepts once learned tend to disappear into the background. 
Michael Lynch made a related point in explaining key concepts of ethno-
methodology to beginners in science studies. For instance, the concept 
‘indexicality’ emerged initially out of early experiments at computer-
based language translations. Early programs could not make sense of 
pronouns, such as ‘he’ she’ and ‘it’; deictic expressions, such as ‘here’, 
‘this,’ or ‘over there;’ auxiliary verbs; and ‘anaphoric uses,’ in which a 
term’s meanings vary in different clauses of a sentence. These terms only 
make sense in reference to particular contexts, and resist attempts at any 
extra-local specification. (“It’s hot enough now” can mean the egg is 
cooked, the ice is melting, or it’s time to turn off the furnace. 31 degrees 
Celsius at 50 degrees of latitude on 4 July doesn’t work.) 
As Lynch put it, “once it is agreed that all utterances and activities 
are indexical, then it no longer makes sense to suppose that a system of 
context-free and standardized meanings can apply to all occasions of 
natural language use. Less obviously, however, it no longer makes sense 
to treat the unrealizable possibility of such a context-free system as a 
general backdrop for analyzing situated practices” (1983: 22). Lynch de-
scribed ‘indexicality’ as one of the tickets that give access to the ‘ethno-
methodological theatre.’ Once one is inside, it is no longer necessary to 
go on purchasing it. 
A complication for sociologists is that there are a number of concepts 
that circulate under the same name, but whose meanings are quite differ-
ent. As Christian Caron (2013) has shown, the concept ‘reflexivity’ burst 
into common sociology-speak from the 1990s, but ‘reflexivity’ works in 
radically different ways in different strains of sociological theorizing. In 
its most obnoxious ‘narcissistic’ variety, it denies the very possibility of 
a common stock of sociological discourse. No one using ‘reflexivity’ in 
Canadian sociology can assume readers will immediately share a com-
mon understanding of their particular usage. Arpad Szakolczai’s own re-
flexive historical sociology (1998 a and b; 2000a and b) goes further by 
suggesting the inadequacy of invoking labels such as ‘Marxist,’ ‘Durk-
heimian,’ or ‘Weberian’ to locate one’s work or that of others. Szakol-
czai’s individual and collective theoretical biographies point to periods 
of liminality and to formative ‘reading experiences’ for social theorists, 
in consequence of which fundamental elements in understanding and 
analysis may change. It is thus often erroneous to assume strong coher-
ence across a body of work over the course of intellectual biography, or 
to treat any individual work of scholarship as representative of a whole 
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corpus. To read Max Weber as the same scholar before and after he en-
countered Nietzsche and Freud, or before and after his visit to America; 
to read the Marx of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and of 
Grundrisse; to read C.L.R. James before and after he went to England; 
Dorothy Smith before and after ‘institutional ethnography’; or Michel 
Foucault before and after 1970, simply as the same thinker is to miss 
the developments, discoveries, changes of position, and altered concepts 
that appear in the works of any intellectual actively engaged in research 
work and social practice. 
Concepts developed using one set of assumptions to address a par-
ticular set of issues or problems may reappear in a different interpret-
ive framework. There is an accompanying risk of conceptual distortion 
or confusion. For instance, Erving Goffman’s early work is commonly 
treated as a form of ‘dramaturgical analysis’ located in a broad frame 
work that sociologists call symbolic interactionism (to many, one can 
simply say ‘SI’). As others have done, I have commonly used such terms 
to teach Goffman’s Presentation of Self (1959) and Asylums (1961) as 
critiques of Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalist account of individ-
uals as ‘personality systems’ organized in response to Society’s needs 
(1969: 34-57).
It is striking then to read Goffman’s own account of the location and 
assumptions of his work. He reported that ‘symbolic interactionism’ was 
a label applied to some Chicago-style sociology by Herbert Blumer in 
a passing footnote, but Blumer was rarely around Chicago when Goff-
man and his cohort were studying and his work had little impact on their 
actual research. The label was promoted by people calling themselves 
‘ethnomethodologists’ as a means of taking professional distance from 
some of their colleagues, which Goffman deplored. ‘Dramaturgy’ also 
identified no inherent characteristic of his work to Goffman. Instead, he 
argued, such labels became current after some sociologists read Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) and set about looking for soci-
ology’s paradigms. Goffman thought that effort promoted a conservative 
conception of science, and bore little relation to his experience of how 
sociology had developed. His own account of himself was that he was 
in large part ‘a structural functionalist in the traditional sense’ (in Verho-
even 1993: 317). 
Goffman’s concepts have been taken up in ways he did not intend 
and in ways to which he was opposed. Ian Hacking, to take one example, 
altered Goffman’s concept of the ‘looping effect’ in keeping with his 
social constructionist interest in ‘making up people.’ Goffman was con-
cerned with the ways in which attempts by institutionalized individuals 
to resist or deny official definitions of themselves were seen by insti-
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tutions as proof of the very correctness of those definitions. Hacking, 
by contrast, gave a reading in which looping was first and foremost a 
phenomenon of classification (Hacking 1986; 1999: 160). Classifica-
tions created new ways of being, and classified individuals could come 
to conduct themselves in keeping with the categories in which they were 
placed (‘secondary adjustments’ for Goffman, only one of several pos-
sible strategies). 
In another essay, Hacking went further to argue that there was a com-
plementary relation between the analysis conducted by Goffman and that 
of Michel Foucault. Both were described as concerned with discourse, 
but Hacking called Goffman’s approach “bottom-up” because we start 
with individual face-to-face exchanges, and develop an account of how 
such exchanges constitute lives. Foucault, on the other hand, used an ap-
proach called ‘top-down because he starts with a mass of sentences at a 
time and place, dissociated from the human beings who spoke them, and 
uses them as the data upon which to characterize a system of thought, or 
rather, its verbal incarnation, a discursive formation’ (2004: 278).
Goffman had earlier denied the label ‘social constructionist’ in the 
strong sense. Every sociologist is something of a constructionist, he 
noted, since we are aware of cultural and historical relativism in human 
affairs. ‘But where I differ from social constructionists is that I don’t 
think the individual himself or herself does much of the constructing. 
He rather comes to a world, already in some sense or other, established. 
I am ... closer to the structural functionalists, like Parsons or [Robert] 
Merton. Just as they were closer to initial functionalist anthropology.’ 
He also explicitly rejected the notion that his work was ‘bottom up’ in 
Hacking’s sense: ‘I don’t think you can go from the individual to society. 
Given society, society has got to make use of individuals or constitute 
individuals in such a fashion that social organization can be sustained’ 
(in Verhoeven 1993: 318; 323-4).
In the interesting interview from which I have been quoting, Goff-
man also affirmed his belief that practitioners are by no means the best 
judges of their own practice. As he put it, ‘what an individual says he 
does, or what he likes that he does, has very little bearing very often 
on what he actually does. It seems to me that you can’t get a picture 
of anyone’s work by asking them what they do or by reading explicit 
statements in their texts about what they do. Because that’s by and large 
all doctrine and ideology’ (1993: 322). Goffman rarely made statements 
about theoretical orientations. Before he became concerned with ‘frame 
analysis’, his published work focussed directly on face-to-face relations 
and, even in his ASA presidential address he remained committed to 
specifying the outlines of an ‘interaction order’ (1983). Hacking may 
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have better understood Goffman’s position than did Goffman himself, 
but it is remarkable that a great many intellectuals have found little or no 
trace of a structural-functionalist grounding in his work. 
My ‘looping’ example is meant to show that concepts can be de-
tached from the conditions under which they emerged and can be put 
to uses that those who developed them did not intend. In some cases 
such detachment is not a problem; indeed rigid conceptual orthodoxy 
can impede research work. In other cases detachment does damage to the 
concepts in question or encourages usages that are imprecise.
Detachment from the context of emergence is perhaps easier with 
‘sensitizing’ or ‘intuitive’ concepts: concepts that point to phenomena 
worthy of study or to questions interesting to pose. Such concepts may 
aid in work of analysis, but they may also serve as placeholders to fill 
problem spaces that we know to exist, but for which we have no strong 
analytic resources. Such concepts typically resist specification or disin-
tegrate when the attempt is made to specify them exactly. This charac-
teristic makes them flexible, but it also encourages gestural usage and 
mis-appropriation or distortion.
Take, for instance, the convoluted career of Raymond Williams’ con-
cept ‘structure of feeling.’ Williams developed the concept in a cultural 
critique of Marxist economism in order to do two kinds of work: to focus 
analysis on the substance of works of cultural production, and to encour-
age investigation of the cultural roots of critical consciousness. Thus, 
rather than taking the class location of cultural producers as proof of the 
class content of their products, Williams investigated the internal econ-
omies of texts (especially literary texts) as such. ‘The notion of a struc-
ture of feeling,’ as he put it, ‘was designed to focus a mode of historical 
and social relations which was yet quite internal to the work, rather than 
deducible from it or supplied by some external placing or classification’ 
(1979: 164). An analyst could detect structure of feeling ‘in a pattern 
of impulses, restraints, tones, for which the best evidence was often the 
actual conventions of literary or dramatic writing’ (1979: 159). 
On the other hand, while rejecting the concept of ‘false conscious-
ness,’ Williams wanted ‘structure of feeling’ to give access to an organ-
ized disjuncture between the lived experience of subordinate groups 
or classes and the dominant forms and practices of cultural expression 
available in society. In his Marxist understanding, class exploitation and 
domination are lived viscerally and the means of expression for them in 
hegemonic cultures are inadequate. The existence of a subordinate struc-
ture of feeling is made manifest when ‘an experience which is really very 
wide suddenly finds a semantic figure which articulates it’ (1979: 164). 
Williams insisted that lived popular or working class ‘experience’ was 
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a material reality with the potential to burst the bounds of the ‘selective 
tradition’ of hegemonic culture. It was anchored in a deeply felt solidar-
ity, manifest in ‘features of the inflexion and timbre of familiar speech 
which carries what is already known, and which need not always be 
articulated more elaborately’ (quoted in Filmer 2003: 205).
And yet, the concept ‘structure of feeling’ lost much of its bite as 
Williams both deepened his engagement with a Gramscian analysis of 
hegemony and grappled with the popularity of Thatcherite politics. He 
came to argue that there were dominant and subordinate structures of 
feeling and that the available cultural articulations might constrain op-
position or mystify understanding. As he put it, ‘a dominant set of forms 
or conventions—and in that sense structures of feeling—can represent 
a profound blockage for subordinate groups in society, above all an op-
pressed class. In these cases, it is very dangerous to presume that an 
articulate structure of feeling is necessarily equivalent to inarticulate ex-
perience’ (Williams 1979: 164). The promise that the lived culture of 
domination might find spontaneous and oppositional expression in new, 
critical semantic figures receded in the face of working class Thatcher-
ism: hegemonic cultural practice more deeply invaded common sense. 
If popular common sense embodied hegemonic culture, the grounds for 
assigning it critical insight were undermined, and with them, perhaps, 
the promise of ‘structure of feeling’
Nonetheless, ‘structure of feeling’ spread rapidly and widely through 
the new field of cultural studies and into culturally-oriented enquiry in 
other domains. Many of these uses are not framed by the cultural Marx-
ism which the concept presumed. Authors now invoke and explain it 
in greater or lesser detail and with various kinds of emphasis in the an-
thropology of state formation and nationalism, in curriculum studies in 
education, in the investigation of television content, in studies of popu-
lar emotional outpourings, in political theory, in the sociology of music, 
and beyond (for some examples, Alonso 1994; Best 2012; Filmer 2003; 
Grossberg 1998; Harding and Pribram 2002; Jordan 2011; Kirk 1999; 
Simpson 1992; Zembylas 2002).
The concept has acquired such currency in social science discourse 
that some people invoke it, or gesture towards it, without citing Williams 
any longer and with no attempt at explication. Perhaps this is a common 
fate of popular concepts, but they may become denatured in the process. 
Thus Reed and Alexander can write, in an account of the development of 
American social theory in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘there was also a deep 
change of mood, a shift in the structure of feeling of sociologists, a vague 
yet powerful sense that the time for crisis and renewal had passed, that 
the hopes and dreams of theory belonged to a different time’ (2011: 24). 
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Or Lois McNay, writing on Foucault’s anticipation of the ‘enterprise 
self’, suggests that this political subject presents ethical possibility for 
openness and difference, and then comments that, it remains difficult 
nonetheless to explain ‘how a generalized structure of feeling has suffi-
cient force to amount to a ‘refusal’’ of neo-liberalism (2009: 69). Neither 
paper cites Williams and, although McNay is close to Williams’ polit-
ical concerns, for Reed and Alexander, as for many other casual users, 
‘structure of feeling’ is simply a synonym for the equally elusive ‘mood’ 
or ‘atmosphere.’ Here it works as a placeholder, pointing to but not grap-
pling with a real analytic problem.
This kind of gestural referencing or hand-waving is masterfully dis-
sected in Keith Sawyer’s ‘A Discourse on Discourse’ (2002). Sawyer 
shows that much English-language scholarship points offhandedly to-
wards the work of Michel Foucault whenever the concept ‘discourse’ 
is invoked. People point to various of Foucault’s works, especially the 
Power/Knowledge (1980) collection and Discipline and Punish (1979), 
typically without providing page references. In fact, the relevant work is 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1975), and Foucault’s usage is quite differ-
ent from that typically ascribed to him. His operative concept was not 
‘discourse’, but rather ‘discursive formation.’ After the failure of the Ar-
chaeology project, he rarely invoked the concept and never focussed on 
it again. In fact, Sawyer shows, the concept’s lineage was from Jacques 
Lacan to Roland Barthes and Louis Althusser. It was refined by Michel 
Pêcheux and came into English cultural studies in the 1970s. The first 
generation did not attribute it to Foucault. A more influential source was 
Althusser’s ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (1984), but 
later, jumbled-up readings of Foucault brought ‘discourse’ in the large 
sense into the cultural studies mainstream where it was attributed it to 
him. That Foucault is the source of ‘discourse’ has become such a banal 
belief in English-language sociology that people rarely enquire into the 
matter. Earlier intellectual struggles that pitted ‘ideology’ against ‘dis-
course’ have faded from much disciplinary memory (Purvis and Hunt 
1993).
The (mis-)appropriation of concepts is facilitated as they migrate 
from one domain of investigation and from one theoretical perspective 
to another. Such migrations are often fruitful by pushing local scholar-
ship beyond its limitations but, at times, at the cost of precision in use. In 
the sociology of music, for instance, essentialist conceptions of ‘music’ 
as a thing in itself possessed of some intrinsic qualities were undermined 
in the late 1980s and 1990s by the work of Christopher Small (e.g. 1987; 
1998; 1999). Small insisted that music is not a thing, but rather an ac-
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tivity, and he coined or revived the concept ‘musicking’ to capture the 
phenomenon. As he put it in one formulation, 
It is quite simple. To music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical 
performance. That means not only to perform but also to listen, to provide 
material for performance (what we call composing), to prepare for a per-
formance (what we call practising or rehearsing), or to take part in any 
activity that can affect the nature of that style of human encounter which is 
a musical performance. We should certainly include dancing...(1998: 4).
This definition does not solve all difficulties, of course, since there is an 
assumption that ‘to music’ is different, in ways that are not specified, 
from ‘to have sex’ or ‘to write a sociology paper.’
Still, moving towards performance opened new avenues of research, 
including Tia DeNora’s very influential Music and Everyday Life (2000), 
which reported on interviews where people were asked when, why and 
under what conditions they listened to music. The book reproduced as 
one of its chapters the author’s earlier article ‘Music as a technology of 
the self’ (1999). Thanks mainly to her work, the notion of music as a 
technology of the self has acquired broad currency in this sub-discipline. 
In Roy and Dowd’s authoritative overview of the sociology of music lit-
erature, ‘technology of the self’ is attributed to DeNora (2010: 189-90). 
DeNora has since worked extensively on the therapeutic dimensions of 
the consumption of music. In one of her many later pieces, with a col-
league she examined the role of music in practices of ‘self-care’ (Batt-
Rawden and DeNora 2005).
It seems to pass unnoticed in the music sociology literature that 
‘technologies of the self’ and ‘care of the self’ are concepts developed by 
Michel Foucault. There is no attribution to his work in DeNora’s pieces, 
although the 1999 article’s bibliography listed The Order of Things 
(1970) and The Birth of the Clinic (1973). ‘Techniques of the self’ seems 
to have appeared first in Foucault’s 1981 lecture ‘Sexualité et solitude’ 
(1994a), while the variation ‘technologies of the self’ was used in his 
1980-1 Collège de France course (1994b). As far I can tell, the latter 
concept did not appear in Foucault’s work in English until 1988. For 
Foucault, of course, ‘technologies of the self’ was not intended to ad-
dress only practices of consumption. As one of four social technologies, 
alongside those of signs and symbols (meaning-making), of production, 
and of power or domination, this concept was meant to capture the gen-
eral practices of self-formation effected by individuals themselves. Indi-
viduals do work of self-fashioning in pursuit of some end, making use 
of instruments, techniques, plans, procedures, expert and vulgar know-
ledge, and so on, usually with the aid of experts. Moreover, these four 
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technologies are articulated in Foucault’s analysis, and the intersection 
of technologies of domination and of the self is Foucault’s last definition 
of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1988: 17-19). Pulling the concept out of 
its articulation and treating is as limited to consumption does violence 
to it.
vigilanCe
Bourdieu’s version of reflexivity enjoins a kind of ‘epistemological 
vigilance’ on working sociologists (2001: 173; Curtis 2014: 48-9). He 
claims that we must strive to treat both the object of research and the 
subject of research—ourselves—in the same manner. This double ex-
ercise of objectivation demands that we attempt systematically to make 
ourselves aware of our own research biographies, our location in the 
field of research and our spontaneously preferred strategies: those things 
we commonly take for granted. Bourdieu was not being naive in this 
matter: perfect self-knowledge is impossible; there is always more going 
on than the subject can know is going on. But as Szakolczai also points 
out (1998b: 217), there is also nothing subjective about the history of 
subjectivity. 
Bourdieu’s project involves developing an awareness of how it comes 
to be that we engage in our research strategies and tactics. It means being 
attentive to the use of concepts and categories, especially to the relations 
between conceptual choices and the figuration of the objects of research. 
To my reading, the stance is not an invitation to a confessional mode 
of writing nor a prohibition on flagging our theoretical orientation and 
sources of inspiration. (Doran’s footnote about my work makes me no-
tice that some flagging would have been in order.) Encouragement to be 
aware of formulae does not simply mean abandoning the conventions of 
research in a scholarly community or in the face of the norms of a fund-
ing regime. We need to identify our audiences and write in consequence.
As Kevin Haggerty pointed out in a comment on this essay, citation 
practices may be active attempts by writers to enlist readers in a practice 
community, and I agree. Yet to avoid the kind of gestural references that 
denature concepts, and that may remove their practical purchase on re-
search problems, we should be attentive to the context of emergence of 
the concepts we use and we should attend carefully to the baggage that 
may come with them.
236 © Canadian Journal of SoCiology/CahierS CanadienS de SoCiologie 40(2) 2015
referenCeS
Abrams, Philip. 1988. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State. Journal of 
Historical Sociology 1:58-89.
Alonso, Ana María 1994. The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State 
Formation, Nationalism and Ethnicity. Annual Review of Anthropology 
23:379-405.
Althusser, Louis. 1984. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (extract). Pp. 
22-49 in Essays on Ideology. London: Verso.
Batt-Rawden, Kari , and Tia DeNora. 2005. Music and informal learning in 
everyday life. Music Education Research 7:289-304.
Best, Beverley. 2012. Raymond Williams and the Structure of Feeling of Reality 
TV. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 2:192-201.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2001. Science de la science et réflexivité. Cours du Collège de 
France. 2000-2001. Paris: Éditions Raisons d’Agir.
—. 2014. On the State. Lectures at the Collège de France. New York: Polity.
Burchell, Graham, and et al (Eds.). 1991. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Gov-
ernmentality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Caron, Christian. 2013. Reflexivity at Work:  Making Sense of Mannheim’s, 
Garfinkel’s, Gouldner’s and Bourdieu’s Sociology. PhD thesis, Sociology 
and Anthropology. Ottawa: Carleton University 
Cooper, Frederick, and Rogers Brubaker. 2000. Beyond “Identity”. Theory and 
Society 29:1-47.
Corrigan, Philip, and Derek Sayer. 1985. The Great Arch: English State Forma-
tion as Cultural Revolution. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Curtis, Bruce. 2001. The Politics of Population: Statistics, State Formation, and 
the Census of Canada, 1840-1875. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
———. 2012. Ruling by Schooling Quebec: Conquest to Liberal Governmental-
ity. A Historical Sociology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
———. 2014. Data provenance, metadata, and reflexivity: Comments on meth-
od. Encounters/Encuentros/Rencontres on Education 15:43-61.
de Coninck-Smith, N., and et al (Eds.). 2001. Discipline, Moral Regulation and 
Schooling: a Social History. New York: Garland Press.
Dean, Mitchell. 1994. Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Method and 
Historical Sociology. London: Routledge.
DeNora, Tia. 1999. Music as a Technology of the Self. Poetics 27:31-56.
DeNora, T. 2000. Music in Everyday Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
how MuCh and how not to explain                      237
Doran, Nob. 2015. Beyond Phenomenological Anti-sociologies: Foucault’s 
“Care of his Self” as Standpoint Sociology. Canadian Journal of Sociol-
ogy 40 (2): 131-162
Filmer, Paul 2003. Structures of feeling and socio-cultural formations: the sig-
nificance of literature and experience to Raymond Williams’s sociology 
of culture. British Journal of Sociology 54:199-219.
Foucault, Michel. 1970. The order of things. New YorK: Pantheon.
———. 1973. The Birth of the Clinic. An Archaeology of Medical Perception. 
New York: Vintage.
———. 1975. Discursive Formations. Pp. 31-9 in The Archaeology of Know-
ledge. New York:.
———. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pan-
theon.
———. 1988. Technologies of the Self. Pp. 16-49 in Technologies of the Self: 
A Seminar with Michel Foucault, edited by Luther H. Martin and et al. 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
———. 1994a. Sexualité et solitude. Pp. 168-178 in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988. 
Paris: Gallimard.
———. 1994b. Sujectivité et vérité. Pp. 213-21 in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988. 
Paris: Gallimard.
———. 2007. Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1977-78. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Glasbeek, Amanda (Ed.). 2006. Moral Regulation and Governance in Canada. 
History, Context and Critical Issues. Toronto Canadian Scholars’ Press.
Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, 
NJ: Anchor Books.
———. 1961. Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and 
other inmates. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
———. 1983. The Interaction Order. American Sociological Association. 1982 
Presidential Address. American Sociological Review 48:1-17.
Gordon, Colin (Ed.). 1980. Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge: Selected Inter-
views & Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon.
Grossberg, L. 1998. The cultural studies’ crossroads blues. Cultural Studies 
1:65-82.
Guetzkow, Joshua , Michèle Lamont, and Grégoire Mallard. 2004. What Is 
Originality in the Humanities and the Social Sciences? American Socio-
logical Review 69:190-212.
Hacking, Ian. 1986. Making up People. Pp. 161-71 in Reconstructing individual-
ism : autonomy, individuality, and the self in Western thought, edited by 
Thomas C. Heller and et. al. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
238 © Canadian Journal of SoCiology/CahierS CanadienS de SoCiologie 40(2) 2015
———. 1999. The Social Construction of What. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
———. 2004. Between Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman: between dis-
course in the abstract and face-to-face interaction. Economy and Society 
33:277-302.
Harding, Jennifer, and E. Deidre Pribram. 2002. The Power of Feeling: Locat-
ing Emotions in Culture. European Journal of Cultural Studies 5:407-26.
Hunt, Alan. 1999. Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jordan, Matthew F. 2011. The French connection: Mythologies of La Nouvelle 
Orléans in French discourse on jazz. European Journal of Cultural Stud-
ies 14:507-525.
Kirk, John. 1999. Class, Community and ‘Structures of Feeling’ in Working-
class Writing from the 1980s. Literature & History third series 8:44-63.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Laborier, Pascale, and Pierre Lascoumes. 2005. L’action publique comprise 
comme gouvernementalisation de l’Etat. in Travailler avec Foucault. 
Retours sur le politique, edited by Sylvain Meyet, Marie-Cécile Naves, 
and Thomas Ribemont. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Lynch, Michael. 1993. Scientific practice and ordinary action. Ethnomethod-
ology and social studies of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
McNay, Lois. 2009. Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in 
Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics. Theory, Culture and Society 26:55-
77.
Parsons, Talcott. 1969. Theoretical Orientations on Modern Societies. Pp. 34-57 
in Politics and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press.
Purvis, Trevor, and Alan Hunt. 1993. Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, 
Discourse, Ideology... British Journal of Sociology 44:473-99.
Rancière, Jacques. 1999. Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
———. 2005 [1992]. On the shores of politics. London: Verso.
Reed, Isaac, and Jeffrey C. Alexander. 2009. Social Science as Reading and 
Performance. A Cultural-Sociological Understanding of Epistemology. 
European Journal of Social Theory 12:21-41.
Roy, William G. , and Timothy J. Dowd. 2010. What Is Sociological about 
Music? Annual Review of Sociology 36:183-203.
Simpson, David. 1992. Raymond Williams: Feeling for Structures, Voicing His-
tory. Social Text 30:9-26.
how MuCh and how not to explain                      239
Small, Christopher. 1987. Music of the Common Tongue: Survival and Celebra-
tion in Afro-American Music. New York: Riverrun Press.
———. 1998. Musicking: the meanings of performing and listening. Hanover 
and London University Press of New England/Wesleyan University 
Press.
———. 1999. Musicking—the meanings of performing and listening. A lecture. 
Music Education Research 1:1-21.
Star, Susan Leigh. 2010. This is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Ori-
gin of a Concept. Science, Technology, & Human Values 35:601-617.
Szakolczai, Arpad. 1998a. Max Weber and Michel Foucault: Parallel Life Works. 
London: Routledge.
———. 1998b. Reflexive Historical Sociology. European Journal of Philosophy 
1:209-27.
———. 2000a. Norbert Elias and Franz Borkenau. Intertwined Life-Works. 
Theory Culture Society 17:45-69.
———. 2000b. Reflexive Historical Sociology. London: Routledge.
Valverde, Mariana. ed., Studies in moral regulation (Toronto, Centre of Crim-
inology, 1994). Book version of Special Issue of Canadian Journal of 
Sociology .
Verhoeven, Jef C. 1993. An Interview With Erving Goffman, 1980. Research on 
Language & Social Interaction 26:317-348.
Walters, William. 2012. Governmentality: Critical Encounters. London: Rout-
ledge.
Weir, Lorna. 2008. The Concept of Truth Regime. Canadian Journal of Sociol-
ogy/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 33:367-89.
Williams, Raymond. 1979. Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Re-
view. London: New Left Books.
———. 1980. Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays. London: 
Verso.
Zembylas, Michalinos 2002. Structures of Feeling in Curriculum and Teaching: 
Theorizing the Emotional Rules. Educational Theory 52:187-208.
Bruce Curtis teaches in the department of Sociology and Anthropology at 
Carleton University, with cross-appointments to History and Political Economy.
bruce_curtis@carleton.ca 
240 © Canadian Journal of SoCiology/CahierS CanadienS de SoCiologie 40(2) 2015
